

REVISITING INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE IN THE HISTORY OF INDONESIA The Case of Malino Declaration for Maluku

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Abstract

Conflict between Muslims and Christians in Moluccas (1999-2002) is one of the worst conflicts in Indonesia which brings great damage in all fields of human life. The significant result of reconciliation can be found in Central Government's effort called as Malino Declaration II. This paper aims to find a positive contribution on formulating the key for facing the fact of religious plurality in Indonesia by revisiting the Malino Declaration II. By critically analyzing the discourse of the Malino Declaration contents, it concludes that Malino Declaration is shaky for several reason, (1). The role of Government is so dominant, thus Government is in the safe position. Therefore, it is understandable why many people view Government aims to "clean" its mistakes in the conflict. (2). Military as a tool was not only ineffective and bias, but also it caused mass killings under the banner of national stability. (3) Malino Declaration indicates obviously and strongly that the conflict is pure between Muslim and Christian communities in Moluccas, as the result the blame is theirs, (4) contain of declaration gives an impression that the participants who are representative of each community do not have enough room in expressing and waging in dialogue. In other words, Malino Declaration is still far from genuine dialogue.

[Konflik antara Muslim dan Kristiani di Maluku (1999-2002) adalah salah satu konflik terburuk di Indonesia yang menyebabkan kerusakan luar biasa di segala bidang kehidupan manusia. Hasil rekonsiliasi yang signifikan adalah usaha pemerintah pusat terkait perumusan Deklarasi Malino II. Dengan meninjau kembali Deklarasi Malino II, tulisan ini bertujuan untuk menemukan kontribusi positif dalam merumuskan kunci dalam menghadapi fakta pluralitas agama di Indonesia. Dengan menganalisis secara kritis wacana isi Deklarasi Malino, dapat disimpulkan bahwa Deklarasi Malino lemah dengan alasan: pertama, peran pemerintah sangat dominan sehingga pemerintah ada di posisi aman. Karenanya, dapat dipahami mengapa banyak orang melihat pemerintah bermaksud “membersihkan” kesalahannya dalam konflik tersebut; kedua, militer sebagai alat tidak efektif dan bias serta menyebabkan pembunuhan massa di bawah bendera kestabilan nasional; ketiga, deklarasi Malino mengindikasikan secara jelas dan tegas bahwa konflik tersebut antara komunitas Muslim dan Kristen di Maluku sehingga kesalahan adalah pada kedua kelompok ini; keempat, isi deklarasi memberikan kesan bahwa para partisipan yang mewakili masing-masing komunitas tidak mendapatkan ruang yang cukup dalam mengekspresikan dan melaksanakan dialog. Dengan kata lain, Deklarasi Malino masih jauh dari makna dialog yang sebenarnya.]

Keywords: *Moluccas Conflict, Malino Declaration, Separatism and Radicalism, Discriminative Politics*

Introduction

The fact that human beings live in the plural world is not a new issue. Unlike before, plurality, which has been presenting in terms of gender, belief, religion, ethnicity, and culture, obtains much attention nowadays. As Amin Abdullah mentions, the fact of plurality is natural at first; it becomes problematic when it encounters with other issues especially economy, religion, and politics.¹

Focusing on religious plurality, the encounter between religious

¹ M. Amin Abdullah, *Dinamika Islam Kultural: Pemetaan atas Wacana Keislaman Kontemporer* (Bandung: Mizan, 2000), p. 69.

societies and empiric realities, for instance, does not always take a constructive dialogical discourse.² Tensions and conflicts among religions have been existed from the beginning of human history. This is inevitable in the light of the *janus-faced* characteristic of religion. In the one hand, religion provides inclusive, universal, and transcending values, but in the other, religion is exclusive, particular, and primordial.³ Recently, interreligious dialogue is convinced as one of sufficient paths to understand religious plurality.

From the beginning of Indonesian independence, the founding fathers faced with religious plurality and its potentiality in tension and conflict. In 1945, Japan agreed to form *Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Kemerdekaan* (BPUPKI, Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence). The members of this committee consist of Indonesian and Japanese. They projected a constitution and determined the foundation of Indonesian state. The debate arose when Muslim figures wanted Islam as the foundation of the state, whereas nationalists chose nationality as the foundation. The result of this committee was called as Jakarta Charter. Although compromise occurred, there was something bothering concerning the first principle: *'Ketuhanan dengan kewadajiban menjalankan syari'at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknja'* (Godhead with the obligation for adherents of Islam to carry out Islamic law). In August 7, *Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (PPKI, Committee for Preparation of Indonesia's Independence) was formed and the members were dominated by nationalists. In the meeting of PPKI, the objection of Christians in the East Indonesia raised concerning the seven words. Then, in August 18, 1945, the members agreed to change the seven words by 'Yang Maha Esa,' thus the formulation of the first principle became 'Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa.' It is important to note that not only

² Bakhtiar Effendy, *Masyarakat Agama dan Pluralisme Keagamaan: Perbindangan mengenai Islam, Masyarakat Madani, dan Etos Kewirausahaan* (Yogyakarta: Galang Press, 2001), p. 5.

³ *Ibid*, p. 7-8.

Christians who refused the seven words, but also several Muslims.⁴ At the same time, the suggestion of Muslim figures on creating Department of Religious Affairs was rejected. These two events brought a tension between Muslim leaders and nationalists. In January 1946, Sutan Sjahrir decided to establish Department of Religious Affairs. There is an issue that this step was to compromise with Muslim group because the Dutch tried to put back its power in Indonesia. Thus, Department of Religious Affairs can be regarded as the real form of ideological compromise.⁵

In the *Demokrasi Terpimpin* (Guided Democracy) Era, the tension between Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI/Indonesian Communist Party) and Nahdatul Ulama (NU) occurred. Saifuddin Zuhri, the Minister of Religious Affairs who also a member of NU, “pushed” President Soekarno to create *Penetapan Presiden* (president decree) No. 1 1965 concerning *Pencegahan Penyalahgunaan dan/atau Penodaan Agama* (Prevention of Misuse and/or Defamation of Religion).

After Gerakan September 30, 1965, the immense conversion among Indonesian brought the tension and conflict between Muslims and Christian. Christianization became a big issue. In facing the phenomenon, Muslim group demanded several things: *first*, the spreading of religion is only addresses to non-religion people. *Second*, building house of worship has to be approved by the local residents. *Third*, government must controls the foreign aids to religious institutions. *Fourth*, interreligious married is forbidden. *Fifth*, religious teachings in school have to be teach by the teacher who has the same religion with the student. The New Order tried to fulfill these demands.⁶

In the late of nineteen sixtieths, religious tension and conflict broke and demanded Indonesian Government to find a proper solution. Terms

⁴ See Fatimah Husein, *Muslim-Christian Relations in the New Order Indonesia: the Exclusionist and Inclusivist Muslims' Perspectives* (Bandung: Mizan, 2005).

⁵ Mujiburrahman, “Islam dan Hubungannya dengan Agama-Agama Lain di Indonesia.” *Workshop Islam dan Pluralisme yang diselenggarakan the WAHID Institute di Griya Kusuma Indah (GKI), Pacet, Mojokerto, Jawa Timur*, 6 November 2007.

⁶ Mujiburrahman, “Islam dan Hubungannya...”

of interreligious dialogue as the solution raised and Mukti Ali became the pioneer. As the Minister of Religious Affairs in 1972, he had the best position to promote and apply interreligious dialogue in Indonesia. Then, many interreligious dialogues were conducted in Indonesia, sponsored by both government and private institutions.⁷

In the short words, the New Order seemed to struggle on diversity. SARA (*Suku, Agama, Ras, Antar-Golongan*/Ethnicity, Religion, Race, Inter-Group Relation) is the famous slogan during the New Order era. For the struggle, from 1969, the New Order Government forbade public meetings which aimed to support and promote Jakarta Charter, therefore ideological Muslim figures could not perform in public sphere.⁸ Nevertheless, the struggles seem to find a failure when the great violent conflict between Muslims and Christians in Poso and Moluccas occurred in the end of the New Order.

Conflict in Moluccas is one of the worst conflicts in Indonesia which brings great damage in all fields of human life. In addition, it took a lot of time in finding the solution. The conflict started in the beginning of 1999 and showed a progress until finding a solution in the beginning of 2002. The efforts of reconciliation were conducted by INGOs local NGOs, groups of local society, Local Government, and Central Government. The significant result can be found in Central Government's effort called as Malino Declaration II. Nevertheless, several protests and debates on the content of the declaration arise. Several scholars have made researches on the strengths and the weaknesses

⁷ Such as in Jakarta (July 27-28, 1972), Cirebon (July 26, 1972), Bandung (August 28- September 3 1972), Surabaya (December 9-13, 1972, Yogyakarta (February 6-10, 1973), Jakarta (April 8-11, 1973), Banjarmasin (March 29-31 1973), Medan (April 24-28, 1973), Ujung Pandang (April-May, 1973), Manado (November, 13-17, 1973), Palembang (January 8-11, 1974), Banjarmasin (March 29-31, 1974), Kupang (October 29-November 1, 1974), Pontianak (December 5-9, 1974), Medan (November 20-23 1975), Ujung Pandang (January 25-February 5, 1976), Samarinda (January 24-27, 1977), Kupang (April 18-21, 1977), Palangkaraya (December 5-8, 1977) (see. Zakiah Darajat, et al. 1996).

⁸ Mujiburrahman, "Islam dan Hubungannya...

of Malino Declaration II. This paper does not aimed to explore the strengths and the weaknesses of Malino Declaration II directly, but to find a positive contribution on formulating the key for facing the fact of religious plurality in Indonesia by revisiting Malino Declaration as one of interreligious dialogues in Indonesian historical experiences. To obtain this aim, this paper discusses three main issues: discriminative politics, separatism and radicalism, and military neutrality.

Declaration of Malino for Moluccas: Coming to the Terms (?)

In December 20, 2001, Indonesian government brokered a meeting in Malino for ending a conflict in Poso which is later on called as Malino Declaration for Poso or Malino Declaration I. This declaration was regarded successful, therefore Jusuf Kalla, the Coordinating Minister for People's Warfare, initiated to make such declaration for conflict in Moluccas. Many people viewed that the conflict in Moluccas was more complicated than in Poso, thus such declaration would be ineffective for Moluccas. Nevertheless, Jusuf Kalla believed that there would be no chance for such meeting in the future.⁹ For that reason, in February 12, 2002, under the coordination of Jusuf Kalla and Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affair, 35 people of each community of Muslim and Christian met in Malino, South Sulawesi for three days and came to the terms 12 points as follows,

1. Ending the conflict and all kinds of violence.
2. The restoration of the supremacy of the law in a just, clear and balanced way; a professional and impartial stance by the security forces.
3. The rejection of all forms of separatism, among others the Republic of South Moluccas, that threaten the integrity and sovereignty of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia.

⁹ Adreas A. Yewangoe, "Reconciliation in the Indonesian Context," in Von Sicard (eds.), *LWF Studies, Dialogue and Beyond: Christian and Muslim Together on the Way*, (Switzerland: The Lutheran World Federation, 2003), p. 121.

4. Being a part of the unitary state, all Moluccas citizens have the right to stay, work and be active in all parts of the state. Likewise, all non-Moluccas citizens have the same right in the Province of Maluku, if they respect the local culture and support law and order.

5. All organizations that carry arms without permission, will be prohibited and have to surrender their arms under the threat of legal steps. Groups from outside the Moluccas that cause unrest are obliged to leave the area.

6. An independent investigation team will be installed to investigate the beginning of the violence on 19 January 1999, the role of organizations such as the Front *Kedaulatan Maluku*, the RMS, *Kristen RMS*, the *Laskar Jihad* and *Laskar Kristus*, the matter of forced conversion and the violation of human rights.

7. The phase return of displaced persons to their places of origin.

8. The government will support the reconstruction and rehabilitation in the material as well as in the non-material field.

9. Emphasis will be laid upon the necessity of neutral stance by the military and the police.

10. In sermons in churches and mosques, the need of mutual respect will be stressed continuously.

Support for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Pattimura-university in balanced way.

After this declaration, huge numbers of Military arrived in Moluccas and pushed extremists went out from Moluccas back to their hometown, Java. Violence decreased until two third, but it still occurred at local level.¹⁰ In July 27, 2002, for instance, a bomb exploded in a Christian market and caused 53 people died. In September 2002, the bombing

¹⁰ Biro Demokrasi, "Hak-Hak Asasi dan Perburuhan," *Laporan Kebebasan Agama International*, December 18, 2003, Public Affairs Section, p. 1.

explosion occurred in other place and 3 people died.¹¹ Nevertheless, the declaration of Malino for Moluccas is one of “the platforms of conflict resolution” which has obtained the most significant support from government and tied Muslims and Christian in Moluccas who were positioned as conflicting parties.¹² In addition, this declaration showed a public general wish for ending the violence.¹³

Several scholars and observers found, the declaration is shaky and still leads to another conflict for several reasons. For example, many people view that the dominant role of political elites is so obvious, thus it is failed in representing the honesty of communities. In addition, the implementation of the declaration in economy particularly is very slow.¹⁴ According to Malik, the strengths of the declaration are in the media campaign, facilitator figures and the stimulus for law enforcement, whereas the weaknesses are the declaration is still fire fighting vision, top down approach, dominant elite participation and instant pattern. As the result, the declaration is ineffective as a resolution conflict in Moluccas besides no genuine dialogue between the parties.¹⁵ Thus, do Muslims and Christian come to the terms in the Malino Declaration for Moluccas? The following discussion focuses on three issues are essential for me in the Malino Declaration, which leads us to answer this question.

Discriminative Politics

During, Dutch colonial, territories in Moluccas were divided based on religion. Therefore, in the present, we found *Soa-Soa* and *Negeri-Negeri*

¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 15.

¹² John Pieris, *Tragedi Maluku: Sebuah Krisis Peradaban* (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2004), p. 273.

¹³ European Commission Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit, “Report on the EC conflict prevention assessment mission to Indonesia,” March 2002.

¹⁴ See John Pieris, “Tragedi Maluku and Ichsan Malik, The Malino Process in Conflict Resolution in Poso and Maluku,” in *Violent Internal Conflicts in Asia Pacific: Histories, Political Economies and Policies* (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, LIPI, LASEMA –CNRS, KITLV, 2005.)

¹⁵ Ichsan Malik, “The Malino Process in Conflict Resolution,” p. 277-278.

where its administration was based on religion (*Negeri Salam* and *Negeri Sarani*). Dutch, itself, provided a great opened opportunity to Christians than to Muslims. This becomes the beginning of high tension between the two communities, especially on job opportunity and bureaucracy.¹⁶

Significant changing for societies in Moluccas occurred in the New Order when modernization in all fields of human life has begun. Amount of migrants drastically increased, thus Moluccas has been inhabited by Butonese, Bugisnese, Makasarnese, Minahasanese, Javanese, and Chinese. Most of these migrants are Muslims. As the result, the relation of ethnic-religion groups changed.¹⁷ The changing started in 1971 when Muslim population in Moluccas increased while amount of Christians decreased.¹⁸ Job opportunity, which had dominated by Christian before, became opened for indigenous and migrant Muslims especially in bureaucracy. This phenomenon is potential for conflict between Muslim and Christian, and it has been proved that it is not impossible to be open conflict when power and economic sharing became unfair. Issues on Islamization, Christianization, and economic dominant increased especially when the crisis in 1997 occurred.¹⁹ In 2000-2001, mass conversion took place and people assume that local leaders involved in it.²⁰ Due to the crisis, social, security and public order were bothered and led to a conflict between Migrant Muslims of Bugisnese and indigenous Christians as well as between indigenous Muslims and Christians. The issue is not only about social-economy but also about religious identity.²¹ Based on the facts above, many scholars view that the seed of conflict has been

¹⁶ Pieter Tanamal and Lambang Trijono, "Religious Conflict in Maluku: In Search of Religious Community Peace," in Lambang Trijono (ed.), *The Making of Ethnic and Religious conflict in Southeast Asia*, Majalah Kumpulan Karangan (Yogyakarta, 2004), p. 323-324.

¹⁷ See Ziwar Effendi, *Hukum Adat Ambon Lease* (Jakarta: PT. Pradnya, 2001), p. 15.

¹⁸ Pieter Tanamal and Lambang Trijono, "Religious Conflict in Maluku," p. 231.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 236-237.

²⁰ Biro Demokrasi, Hak-Hak Asasi dan Perburuhan, p. 18.

²¹ Pieter Tanamal and Lambang Trijono, "Religious Conflict in Maluku...", p. 231.

existed in the structural fact of ethnic and religious group relations in the past and the present.

Another problem, which existed along with the phenomenon above, is the New Order Government put much more on uniformity than the variety of cultures and ethnics. This policy operated under the flag of national stability where Military became a tool. As the result, Central Government did not provide enough room for people in the grassroots to use their local wisdoms for solving their own problems. In other side, the New Order Government did not have an efficient policy concerning integration. Uncertainty identity for migrants as *Anak Dagang* not *Anak Negeri* is one of the examples.²² Because of this policy, the New Order had no power to deal with the conflict in Maluku. As Ecip found, in 1992 local traditional leaders in Maluku had used the strategy of traditional land mapping movement in the conflict.²³

After the falling of New Order Government, Indonesian people hope that democratization walks in the right track. One aspect of democratization programs is decentralization. Indonesian Minister for Home Affair and Regional Autonomy, Surjadi Soedirdje, explains that decentralization is the significant component of democratic reform in Indonesia.²⁴ However, this process is not without a risk because “Democratization and decentralization create the basis for provoking and heightening the ethnic-religious conflict,”²⁵ as we found in Moluccas and other regions in Indonesia.

The historical phenomenon above shows that the changing of dominant position in Moluccas occurred for years and this has to get more attention. However, it is uneasy to accept the followers of other

²² Djohan Effendi, “Reconciliation in the Indonesian Context,” in Von Sicard (eds.), *LWF Studies, Dialogue and Beyond...*, p.113 & 236.

²³ S. Sinansari Ecip, *Menyulut Ambon, Kronologi Merambatnya Berbagai Kerusuhan Lintas Wilayah di Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Mizan, 1999), p. 50-51.

²⁴ Alan Tidwell and Charles Lerche, “Globalization and Conflict Resolution,” *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol. 9. No. 1 Spring/Summer 2004, p. 52.

²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 51.

religion or different ethnic person become more dominant in bureaucracy. This phenomenon also seems to demonstrate that a discriminative politics has been existed from the beginning of Moluccas formed. Malino Declaration (item no. 4) reminds Moluccans and Migrant, Muslim and Christian to realize this historical phenomenon and pushes the communities to compete fairly. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Central Government must also respect on local culture, thus province obtains proper policy and intervention in the right time. In other words, cultivating the awareness of the importance of local culture and of acceptance of plurality for all parties is needed. However, religious and ethnic differences are potential for conflict and tension such as separatism and radicalism.

Separatism and Radicalism

Malino Declaration for Moluccas (item no.3) emphasizes that Moluccans have to reject all forms of separatism because it threatens the integrity of state. In its item, the declaration directly mentions Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS, Republic of South Moluccas) as the example of separatism movement. Is the mention of RMS as an example of separatism because RMS arises once more in Moluccas or it is merely the using of collective memory strategy by Government?

In 1950, conflict between Republik Maluku Selatan and other Moluccans occurred. RMS supported by Dutch wanted Moluccas to be independent while the others supported by Indonesia wished to joint with Indonesian state. In 1961, Indonesian government succeeded in wiping the RMS 's dream out. Later on, many members of RMS involved in Forum Kedaulatan Maluku (FKM, Moluccas Sovereign Front). For this reason, government views FKM as a “dangerous” organization. In January 28, 2003, Alex Manuputty, the leader of Forum Kedaulatan Maluku was jailed for 3 years due to the accusation of subversion.²⁶

²⁶ Biro Demokrasi, “Hak-Hak Asasi...,” p. 16.

The emphasis of separatism in Malino Declaration is indeed different with what Tidwell and Lerche state about Moluccas. They found that “There is no separatism active movement in Maluku such as in Aceh and Papua. RMS sought the separation but it is not a large force and has no military means.”²⁷ According to Pieris, the stressing of RMS issue in Malino Declaration is aimed to shift the main issue of the conflict. The members of RMS who then joint with FKM might bring a conflict but it is just because TNI failed in bringing the end of conflict. Even, there is an impression that TNI let the emergence of RMS. Besides that, Pieris views that Malino declaration (item no. 3) reflects the formulation of discriminative politics since separatism is not the only one that threatens Indonesian integrity. Sectarianism, which aims to shift Pancasila ideology such as Laskar Jihad and Mujahidin, is also potential for threatening Indonesian integrity, even Laskar jihad and Mujahidin also provided political and logistic supports by armed troops in Moluccas. But, why do not both movements have the same position as RMS and FKM? For Pieris, this shows that Muslim and Christian political atmosphere is imbalance and proves that Muslim thinkers are clever in formulating Malino Declaration faced with inexperienced Christian thinkers in politics.²⁸ He continued that discriminative politics is also indicated clearly in Malino Declaration (item no. 6), which mentions FKM, Kristen RMS and Laskar Kristus related to a forced conversion and the violation of human right compared to Laskar Jihad. This formulation brings moral disadvantages in Christian party. Kristen RMS and Laskar Kristus should not be mentioned in the formulation since it will indicate that Christian more involved in the conflict than Muslims did.²⁹

The items of Malino Declaration explained above seem to be contradictive with other item (no. 5) which states that “All organizations that carry arms without permission, will be prohibited ...” As Pieris states,

²⁷ Alan Tidwell and Charles Lerche, “Globalization...,” p. 51.

²⁸ John Pieris, *Tragedi Maluku...*, p. 274-277.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 278-279.

this item is a mess in the structure since it means that all organizations that carry arms with permission is allowed. In addition, this item shows that no clear punishment for the members of the movement or organization who carry arms will be taken. Normatively, it ignores the principle of justice and law order.³⁰ Meanwhile, according to FKM, *jihad* is international terrorism in the banner of religion, therefore it has to be abolished, but in Malino Declaration, it is protected.³¹ In the following passage, we find why several scholars and organizations have paid more attention on Laskar Jihad in Moluccas.

Laskar Jihad came from Java to Moluccas in May 2000. This movement was formed in January 30, 2000 in Yogyakarta by Ja'far Umar Thalib, the leader of *Forum Komunikasi Ablussunnah wal Jama'ah* [FKAJW]. Laskar Jihad, which is paramilitary, aimed to defend Muslims from religious persecution.³² For this purpose, Laskar Jihad had a formal structure of Indonesian military such as brigades, battalion, companies, platoons, teams, and intelligence service.³³

The tragedy in al Fatah mosque, Ambon in 1999, had brought Ja'far Umar thalib to establish Laskar Jihad. This movement more focused on Muslims who killed by RMS with Christianity as the political back up.³⁴ Put simply, Laskar Jihad wanted to respond on Christian villages attacks.³⁵ Besides that, as International Crisis Group (ICG) found, "the massacre by Christian of over 400 Muslims at Tabelo, North Maluku during the last week of December 1999, had inflamed Muslim sentiment

³⁰ *Ibid*, p. 278.

³¹ Front Kedaulatan Maluku (FKM), "Pernyataan Sikap Terhadap Hasil Perjanjian Malino untuk Maluku" 15 Februari 2002.

³² Jon Goss, "Understanding Maluku War: an Overview of the Sources of Communal Conflict and Prospect for Peace," *Cakalele*. Vol. 11-12, 2004.

³³ Noorhaidi Hasan, "Faith and Politics: the Rise of Laskar Jihad in the Era of Transition in Indonesia," *Indonesia* 73 (April 2002), p. 159.

³⁴ Abdul Mu'ti, the Chair of Central Board Muhammadiyah Youth "the Cause of Radicalism of Muslim Communities in Indonesia: a View from Within," p. 3.

³⁵ Jon Goss, "Understanding Maluku...,"

throughout Indonesia.”³⁶

In April 6, 2000, six representatives of Laskar Jihad came to the President Abdurrahman Wahid and asked him to protect Muslims in Moluccas, while at the same time, in front of Merdeka palace, hundreds of Laskar Jihad warriors demonstrated. Thalib stressed that if Government was unable and unwilling to protect Muslims in Moluccas, they were going to do that by themselves.³⁷ In April 30, 2000, 111 Laskar Jihad fighters arrived in Ambon and in the next months, other hundreds fighters followed. The number achieved 7.000 fighters.³⁸

After Malino Declaration, Laskar Jihad made armed attack in April 28, 2002. This is viewed as an effort to interrupt Malino Declaration and became one of reasons to arrest Laskar Jihad leader, Ja’far Umar Thalib.³⁹ Finally, Laskar Jihad was disbanded in October 2002, all members banished and backed to Java without law process. Meanwhile Majelis Mujahidin leaved Maluku before Laskar *jihad* was disbanded. Ja’far Umar Thalib arrested for sharpening religious violence in Moluccas, but, in January 30, Jakarta Court released him. Human Right activists view that high-level politics has involved in it. This was enforced by Major General Sjafrie Sjamsudin’s statement that Laskar Jihad could not be categorized as the threatening of national integrity.⁴⁰ Meanwhile, Ja’far emphasizes that they leaved Moluccas not because of government policy but because of the *fatwa* of Syeikh Robi’ bin Hadi al Makholi from Saudi Arabia. Ja’far said that Laskar Jihad came to Moluccas based on Syeikh Robi’s *fatwa* and they leaved Moluccas also based on his *fatwa*.⁴¹

³⁶ International Crisis Group (ICG) Asia Report No. 31. “Indonesia: The search for Peace in Maluku” (Jakarta, February 8, 2002), p. 5.

³⁷ Sukidi Mulyadi, “Violence Under the Banner of Religion: The Case of Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus,” in *Studia Islamica*, Vol. 10 (2), 2003, p. 83.

³⁸ See Noorhaidi Hasan, “Faith and Politics...,” p. 197.

³⁹ Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, *The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power* (Pittsburg: RAND, 2002), p. 97.

⁴⁰ Biro Demokrasi, “Hak-Hak Asasi...,” p. 15-16.

⁴¹ Shoelhi, 2002 in Abdul Mu’ti p.5.

Using the banner of religion in Moluccas conflict is also found in Laskar Kristus movement. Laskar Kristus derived from the Petra Church in Moluccas. The Petra Church organized GMB (*Gerakan Maluku Berdoa*; Moluccas prayers Movement) as a response for the sake of Moluccan safety.⁴² Laskar Kristus was established in 1998 and had several commanders. Agus Wattinema is one of the commanders who claimed leading 20,000 warriors in Ambon, and 200 children warrior called as *Agas*.⁴³ An interview with Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato university, Wattinema asked Bandow to tell to American Christians that they were needed in Ambon.⁴⁴ In March 20, 2001, Wattinema was killed.

Laskar Kristus was less organized than Laskar Jihad. In addition, it did not have a great armed training, network and Media as Laskar Jihad had. This fact seems to be one of reasons, according to Pieris, for not mention Laskar Kristus in Malino Declaration (item no. 6). I agree with Pieris if Christian RMS should not be mentioned in Malino Declaration (item no. 6) since RMS has been mentioned and there is no reason to make an emphasis on Kristen RMS. Moreover, RMS was not divided into two: Christian RMS and non-Christian RMS. This is different with the present of Laskar Kristus in Moluccas if we look at the description above. Finally, the questions are If separatism and radicalism were so dangerous, why are they able to develop in this country? Why does the tendency on using violence under the banner of religion grow up? Why do military and POLRI (Indonesian National Police) seem to let them develop? How far does Government pay attention on this case? As a tool of Government, can Military provide an effective strategy and be in a neutral position?

⁴² Tabloid Adil, "Tarung Dua Laskar di Jakarta," November 22, 2001.

⁴³ See, Herry Mohammad et.al., "Mencampakkan Dendam Generasi Agas," *Gatra*, No.39 August 17, 2001.

⁴⁴ Sukidi Mulyadi, "Violence Under the Banner..," p. 91-92.

Effectiveness and Neutrality of Military

Soon after conflict had broken in the beginning of January 1999, Government sent military to Moluccas. Later on, Moluccas was determined as a province under Military Aid (*Bantuan Militer*, BANMIL) until June 1999. In June 26, 2000, through President Decree no. 88, Abdurrahman Wahid decided both Moluccas and North Moluccas provinces to be in Civil Emergency Situation in order to make security troops effective. Thousands of Military personnel came to all villages in Moluccas and North Moluccas for at least three years.⁴⁵ In the early of 2001, violence declined and the neutral zone of interaction between Muslim and Christian community could be protected. In addition, Brigadier General I Made Yasa, a Hindu, was chosen as the commander of Pattimura Force to maintain the neutrality of security forces.⁴⁶ Is Military as a tool effective and neutral?

Based on the result of International Crisis Group's investigation, during the first 18 months, Military was ineffective in ending violence, even it also provided contribution to the conflict. They had a weapon and the tactic of "shoot kill" orders that led the death increased. Moreover, they failed to be neutral since they gave different services for two communities, even actively supported their co-religionists.⁴⁷

Military leaders often state the slogan "protecting the unity state of Republic of Indonesia" and "devastating provocateur" when they faced the problem of separatism and social conflicts in several regions in Indonesia. As the result, the status of Civil Emergency and the Military forces always become the answer for the solution of violence actions in Maluku and other regions. In the process, Kasim found that Human

⁴⁵ See, Ifhdal Kasim, et.al., *Tutup Buku dengan "Transitional Justice"? Menutup Lembaran Hak-Hak Asasi Manusia 1999-2004 dan Membuka Lembaran Baru 2005* (Jakarta: Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat (ELSAM), 2005), p. 33.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ ICG Asia Report No. 31. "Indonesia: The search for Peace in Maluku," (Jakarta, February 8, 2002), p. 1.

Right violation such as killing, capture, disappearing people, torture, increased.⁴⁸ *Extrajudicial killing* and *summary execution* appeared when anti-guerrilla operation and the separation of people based on ethnic and religion occurred.⁴⁹ Military and Brimob often involved in the killings of civil people without law process. The justifications of this action are to avoid worse mutual attack between two communities and by claiming that killed people were provocateur, rioter, or agitator. Even, several members of FKM, who criticized strongly the brutal action of Military in overcoming the conflict in Moluccas, were accused as prolongation of RMS. In August 1, 2003, several leaders were captured and took to court for the accusation of coup.⁵⁰

Central Government policy in dividing Moluccas into two provinces, Moluccas and North Moluccas, failed in decreasing the conflict. Several scholars view this policy is just to fulfill the demand of local elite politicians. Moreover, along with the developing province, Korem Pattimura was developed to be the same as KODAM level. However, this is also unsuccessful in ending the conflict, even it led Maluku and North Moluccas to the status of Civil Emergency in June 2000.⁵¹ After Malino Declaration, Government sent Military to Moluccas to push people in order to agree with contain of declaration while groups that do not accept the declaration is forced to be “silent.”⁵²

The neutrality of military in the conflict is also questionable. The statement of Irjen Pol. Muhammad Firman Gani, who became Chair of Region Police in Moluccas, has proved that many military personnel could not be neutral in the conflict. Gani acknowledges that military and POLRI personnel involved in the conflict by providing moral supports and weapons to people who were in the conflict.⁵³ Meanwhile, in its

⁴⁸ Ifhdal Kasim et.al., *Tutup Buku...*, p. 33.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, p. 35.

⁵⁰ The Situation in Maluku/Moluccas-Report 2003, p. 35.

⁵¹ Ifhdal Kasim et.al., *Tutup Buku...*, p. 33.

⁵² *Ibid*.

⁵³ “Kesaksian Polisi di Ambon”, *Kompas*, August 6, 2001.

report, ICG states that when conflict in Moluccas was in the top, TNI (Indonesian National Armed Forces) personnel rent their weapons to Muslim Militants.⁵⁴

From the fact above, it is surprising that in Malino Declaration, there is no item mentions an investigation for Military. It is indeed reasonable when government (including TNI and POLRI) is viewed to “clean” their mistake in the conflict by making emphasis and indication that only Muslim and Christian who involved in the conflict. In fact, State (Government, civil elites, TNI and POLRI) has to be responsible for the mass killings in Moluccas. Besides that, many people believe that Government, TNI and POLRI actions and policies contribute on lateness of the ending of conflict (FKM, 2002).

The description above answers why National Investigation Team created by government is doubted. Pieris, for instance, state that it is difficult to believe the team since the conflict in Moluccas involved many groups including TNI, POLRI and Indonesian Government itself. In addition, Indonesian Government with TNI and POLRI have a great power to push all components thus the result of the investigation team is opposite with truth, justice, and honesty.⁵⁵ Finally, although Malino Declaration (item no. 10) emphasizes that military has to be in neutral, investigation related to Military action in Moluccas for years is also needed.

Conclusion

Moluccans have experienced significant changing in their economic, social, and political life as the result of modernization, democratization, and decentralization. Amount of migrants, for instance, increases drastically and causes the changing of composition in terms of religion and ethnic. Job opportunity and bureaucracy, which is dominated by Christian since Dutch colonial, become more open for Muslim in the New

⁵⁴ Biro Demokrasi, “Hak-Hak Asasi dan Perburuhan...,” p. 15.

⁵⁵ See, John Pieris, *Tragedi Maluku...*,

Order Era. In later development, Muslims are dominant in bureaucracy. Unfortunately, the New Order policy on uniformity was not followed by the strategy of integration; on the contrary, the New Order used Military as a tool in operating this policy. Discriminative politics seems to colour Moluccan's society throughout the history of Moluccas. The changing and shifting had led a tension between Muslim and Christian communities which in turn became opened conflict in January 1999. In Malino Declaration (item no. 4), this case becomes one of focuses in searching reconciliation. This declaration stresses the same right for all Moluccas citizens including migrants if they respect local culture. Unfortunately, government does not treat local culture with respect, thus there is no enough room for local cultural wisdom as the solution of the conflict.

During the conflict, separatism and radicalism became an important issue. Government raises the issue of separatism by Republik Maluku Selatan and Forum Kedauletan Maluku as prolongation of RMS, as one of factors which causes conflict. The display of RMS flags in its anniversary April 25, 2002 by *Forum Kedauletan Maluku* (FKM) gave an impression that RMS has still existed. However, as several scholars emphasize, this fact is weak; on the contrary, Government wants obviously to shift the real cause of conflict by using collective memory on RMS. In addition, as found, RMS in Moluccas cannot be categorized as an active separatist movement as in Aceh and Papua since RMS has no military means and large force. Although Indonesia has to be cautious of separatism, the emphasis of RMS twice: RMS and Kristen RMS in Malino Declaration (item no. 6) are questionable. In addition, no sufficient facts about RMS are divided into Kristen RMS and Non-Kristen RMS.

Radicalism such as Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus is another issue in Malino Declaration besides separatism. Both Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus justified violence under the banner of religion. The former is organized than the latter. Besides that, Laskar Jihad, which came from

Java, more or less brought a new tension in Moluccas. Government's late preventive action related to the arrival of Laskar Jihad is disputed. It seems that Military as government's tools let this happen, even Military rent their military means to militants. Therefore, government investigation team (item no. 6) and the neutrality of military (item no. 9) are doubted. Many evidences show that Government and Military involved in escalating the conflict or in practicing the violation of law and human right, but no investigation is conducted for them. In addition, the ineffective strategy of Military in ending the conflict is not evaluated.

The discussion above enforces the view that Malino Declaration is shaky for several reason, among them (1). The role of Government is so dominant, thus Government is in the safe position. Therefore, it is understandable why many people view Government aims to "clean" its mistakes in the conflict. (2). Military as a tool was not only ineffective and bias, but also it caused mass killings under the banner of national stability. (3) From point (1) and (2), Malino Declaration indicates obviously and strongly that the conflict is pure between Muslim and Christian communities in Moluccas, as the result the blame is theirs, (4) contain of declaration gives an impression that the participants who are representative of each community do not have enough room in expressing and waging in dialogue. In other words, Malino Declaration is still far from genuine dialogue.

One and half year after Malino Declaration, in September 2003, Maluku and North Maluku were liberated from the State of Civil Emergency. Sporadic violence has still existed and community is still divided into two separating Muslim and Christian sectors, which attacked each other (Maluku Media Center, 2003). We have to acknowledge that reconciliation often takes a long time and more or less Malino Declaration has given contribution in achieving it. Nevertheless, interreligious dialogue after the conflict is more complicated than interreligious dialogue aimed at preventive. Interreligious dialogue, which mirrors honesty and openness,

is still needed at all levels.

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