P-ISSN: 1907-7491
E-ISSN: 2502-3705

Epistemé
Jurnal Pengembangan Ilmu Keislaman
Vol. 17, No. 2, December 2022

https://doi.org/10.21274/epis.2022.17.2.143-166

RELIGIOUS MODERATION IN AN EASTERN JAVANESE TOWN: A Survey Report

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Article history: Received: August 20, 2022 | Revised: October 15, 2022 | Published: December 03, 2022

Abstract

This article is a result of a massive survey conducted in Tulungagung, a south-eastern Javanese middle town in the early 2022. The survey involves 2569 data collectors that successfully, following a series of data cleansing, reported refined 7140 data survey. The article is a descriptive analytic which shows the views of respondents of the survey. They are leaders in many Javanese villages in the city which include religious leaders (RL), leaders of community (LC), and young leaders (YL). The survey addresses four important issues that have been officially recognised as the official four pillars of religious moderation (moderasi beragama), namely commitment for Indonesian nationalism, tolerance, anti-violence, acceptance to local cultures. The survey finds that there has been no worrying indicator threatening the four pillars of moderasi beragama and argues that a challenge for religious pluralism in contemporary Java lies at the coexistence between groups within the same religion. It also suggests that "moderating the moderate" has been a key challenge

[1] I would like to thank to members of LP2M, and teams of Satu Data of UIN Sayyid Ali Rahmatullah, and students participating at the community service program (Kuliah Kerja Nyata/KKN) in 2022 for their contribution in the making of this survey. However, I am alone responsible for any errors in this survey and the article. For the complete data visualisation of the survey please refers to this link: *http://uinsatu.tk/ekspossurvey.*

for the state's initiative of moderasi beragama, otherwise the project becomes obsolete.

[Artikel ini bersumber dari sebuah survei moderasi beragama—dilakukan pada awal tahun 2022—yang melibatkan 2569 orang pengimpun data dan, setelah dilakukan pembersihan data, berhasil melaporkan 7140 data. Responden survei terdiri dari tiga kriteria, yaitu tokoh agama, tokoh masyarakat, dan tokoh pemuda, di Tulungagung, Jawa Timur. Survei moderasi beragama ini mengukur keberagamaan masyarakat di Tulungagung melalui empat indikator moderasi beragama sebagaimana dikampanyekan Kementerian Agama Republik Indonesia (Kemenag RI), yaitu komitmen kebangsaan, toleransi, anti-kekerasan, dan penerimaan terhadap tradisi. Survei ini menunjukkan bahwa keberagamaan masyarakat di Tulungagung sudah cukup mencerminkan empat indikator tersebut dan menemukan bahwa persoalan toleransi di kalangan masyarakat adalah terkait dengan penerimaan masyarakat terhadap kelompok berbeda dalam satu agama, bukan antaragama. Survei ini juga menjelaskan bahwa "memoderatkan yang sudah moderat" adalah tantangan moderasi beragama yang patut diperhatikan. Jika tantangan tersebut tidak mampu diantisipasi dengan tepat, maka proyek moderasi beragama tidaklah akan tepat sasaran.]

Keywords: *Moderasi Beragama, Tolerance, Nationalism, Anti-Violence, Local cultures*

Introduction

On 21 May 1998, Soeharto resigned from his presidency. His resignation served as a symbol of hope for Indonesians who wished to build a democratic state, and it pinpointed a new era in Indonesian political history, *era reformasi* (the reformation era). Along with this political transition towards democracy, several Islamic parties and Islamic paramilitary groups, with names like Laskar Pembela Islam (the Islamic Defenders' Force), Laskar Jihad (the Jihad Force), and Laskar Mujahidin (the Mujahidin Forces), were founded.[2] These groups particularly called for committing *jihad* in the Moluccas, where reportedly hundreds of

[2] Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad : Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 2006), p. 13–20.

Muslims were killed by Christians in 1999. The *jihad* project in the Post-Orde Baru Indonesia, according to Sidel, emerged as an expression of anxieties against the backdrop of the failure of Islam in the formal political arena, on the one hand, and the concomitant dissolution of Islam as a unifying force, on the other hand.[3] The radical expressions of Islamic groups during the Post-Orde Baru exemplify political discontent and political strategy in order to elevate Islam as the influential factor – if not the only factor – in the state's politics since the Indonesian independence and after losing the first general election since the *reformasi* in 1999.[4]

Likewise, during the first two decades following the *reformasi,* Indonesians witnessed an increase in number and frequency of bombings and terrorist attacks, thus inciting the larger scale of 'securitization' of Islam. In 2003, the government established two leading institutions specialised in counter-terrorism operations and deradicalization strategies: Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme/BNPT (the National Counterterrorism Agency)–before named Desk Koordinasi Pemberantasan Terorisme–and Datasemen Khusus/Densus 88 (the Special Detachment 88). Whereas the former institution works mainly on 'soft approaches' for counter-radicalisation strategies, the Densus 88 is a special force within the Indonesian police force with a particular task in 'hard approaches' of counter-terrorism operations.[5] The two official bodies have been successful in pacifying terrorist cells and implementing counter-terrorism strategies.

In addition, appealing to the public, some Muslim groups, which Azyumardi Azra called "political Islam," demanded a comprehensive

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[3] John Thayer Sidel, *Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2007), p. 221.

[4] R. William Liddle, "Indonesia in 1999: Democracy Restored," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 40, No. 1 2000, pp. 33.

[5] Muh Taufiqurrohman, "Counterterrorism in Indonesia: Quo Vadis?," *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, Vol. 5, No. 6, 2013, pp. 7–10.

implementation of *sharia* and partly challenged Pancasila.[6] At the Indonesian parliament, the old debate on the omitted seven words of Piagam Jakarta came to the fore again. Along with the wave institutionalisation of Islam into the state's ideology, small Muslim groups aspired to install *sharia* law through local regulations (*peraturan daerah shariah/Perda Shariah*). In other words, the "Islamic turn" following post-*reformasi* democratisation again highlighted an old issue on the Indonesian form of secularism, i.e., on the proper place and scope of Islam in state and society, rather than separation of religion and state. Thus, the debate centred on a question of the limits of the division between religion and state, i.e., the limits of the division and the inclusion of religion in Indonesia's political sphere to which I mentioned elsewhere as "adaptation scale".[7]

At socio-cultural sphere, Indonesians have witnessed the religious revival among believers. This religious resurgence has been observed since the 1980s when religion openly came into the public providing people with religious nuance as an alternative to modem hedonism and capitalism, in addition to as a political vehicle for protest. The economic growth of society and cheap-technological products, mainly imported from China, and the internet make Indonesian Muslims easier and more convenient to access information and to attain religious guidance. In this vein, Indonesian Muslims have experienced "*santrification*" referring to an increase in Islamic piety and a stricter adherence to Islamic practices across large sections of the Indonesian society.[8] Along with the wave of

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[6] Azyumardi Azra, "Islam di Tengah Arus Transisi menuju Demokrasi," in Abdul Mu'in (ed.), *Islam di Tengah Arus Transisi* (Jakarta: Kompas, 2000), p. xiii–xiv; Azyumardi Azra, "Political Islam in Post-Soeharto Indonesia," in Virginia Hooker and Amin Saikal (ed.), *Islamic Perspectives on the New Millennium* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2004), p. 138.

[7] Syaifudin Zuhri, "Regimented Islamophobia: Islam, State, and Governmentality in Indonesia," *QIJIS: Qudus International Journal of Islamic Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2021, pp. 387–422.

[8] Greg Barton, "The Prospects for Islam," in *Indonesia Today: Challenges of History* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), p. 245.

santrification following the *reformasi,* a rise in the number of attacks against non-Muslims and minority Muslim sects, such as Ahmadiyya and other non-orthodox Muslim groups, occurred.[9] For Martin van Bruinessen, in the years following the *reformasi*, Indonesians witnessed the so-called "conservative turn" in contrast with the long-admired "smiling face of Indonesian Islam"[10] and it signifies the "demise of moderate Islam".[11]

From the state's point of view, the wave of Islamic conservatism is seen as a political threat to the state and to Indonesian religious pluralism. And as a counternarrative -among other- to Islamic conservatism, the state officially launched the so-called "*moderasi beragama*" – literally translated as "religious moderation". The project, as I argued elsewhere, is indeed the continuation of the colonial and the postcolonial project to govern Islam into a political subject matter of "affective governance"[12] through appropriating Islamic interpretation in order to define and establish political and religious subjectivities that ensure and justify governability of Muslims. The Kementerian Agama (Indonesian Ministry for Religious Affairs) has been at the forefront for the project. The Minister for Religious Affairs Lukman Hakim Saifuddin who reigned in 2014-2019 played key roles in this *moderasi beragama* project. At the eve of his service, he officially inaugurated "an official manifesto" on *moderasi beragama* through the ministry's publication titled *Moderasi Beragama*. The book highlighted some issues, such as pluralistic Indonesians, the state ideology Pancasila, and religion as a solution—rather than a problem—for the growing religious conservatism. *Moderasi beragama* stands on four

[9] Ahmad Najib Burhani, "When Muslims are Not Muslims: The Ahmadiyya Community and the Discourse on Heresy in Indonesia," *Ph.D Dissertation* (University of California, Santa Barbara, 2013).

[10] Martin van Bruinessen, *Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining "Conservative Turn"* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013).

[11] Wahyudi Akmaliah, "The Demise of Moderate Islam: New Media, Contestation, and Reclaiming Religious Authorities," *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2020, pp. 1–24.

[12] Lorenz Trein, "Governing the Fear of Islam: Thinking Islamophobia through the Politics of Secular Affect in Historical Debate," *ReOrient*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2018, pp. 1.

main pillars: nationalism, tolerance, anti-violence, and acceptance of local cultures.

As for the nationalism ideology, the project of *moderasi beragama* aims to strengthen the state ideology, Pancasila. Rather than seeing Islam vis-à-vis Pancasila, *moderasi beragama* again emphasised the compatibility of Pancasila and Islam.[13] The doctrine of nationalism, as the project constructs, is the "consensus" of Indonesian Muslims that should be maintained and protected from any threat of transnational ideologies, particularly the Islamist transnational ideologies and groups. Thus, as the manifesto of *moderasi beragama* tells, Indonesian form of nationalism contradicts to Anderson's conception[14] of "secular-mode of nationalism" which ignores religion. Indonesian form of nationalism is exclusively religious and reverberates what Jeremy Menchik calls "godly nationalism"- "an imagined community bound by a common, orthodox theism and mobilized through the state in cooperation with religious organizations in society".[15] The current Indonesia government had exercised this godly-nationalism manifesto as repertoire for disbanding transnational Islamist movement of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) in 2017.

In addition to nationalism, through the prologue of the book *Moderasi Beragama*, Lukman Hakim further elaborates the meaning of *moderasi beragama* and writes:

> *Moderasi beragama* aims to attune two-contradictory factions in religiosity. On the one hand, there have been believers who extremely believe their faith as the only valid interpretation towards religious texts and excommunicate different interpretations. This faction is usually mentioned as ultra-conservative. On the other hand, there have also been believers who glorify reasonings while neglecting the purity of the faith and sacrifice their faith for the sake of tolerance toward different

[13] Kementerian Agama, *Moderasi Beragama* (Jakarta: Badan Litbang dan Diklat Kementerian Agama RI, 2019), p. 56.

[14] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Revised ed. (London & New York: Verso, 2006).

[15] Jeremy Menchik, *Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without Liberalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 67.

religious believers. This latter is the extreme liberal faction. Both need to be balanced.[16]

The above quote clearly tells that, despite targeting Islamic conservatism and instilling godly nationalism, *moderasi beragama* also resorts as a criticism of liberal group activism in Indonesia and calls for the need to attune the two competing Islamic interpretations: the conservative and the liberal interpretations of Islam. The conservative, as the official document of *moderasi beragama* mentions, is a mode of thought that tightly holds truth claim while neglecting and -in many cases- excommunicating (*takfir*) those who have different views and often calls for full adaptation of Islam in Indonesian politics, if not to say to establish an Islamic state, particularly through the efforts to insert a reference to Shariah into the Indonesian constitution. The liberal on the other hand is a mode of thought that emerges from the supremacy of reason while neglecting textual dimension of religion.[17] The liberal group activism, tied to the younger generation of Western-educated Muslims within two biggest Muslim organizations in Indonesia, NU and Muhammadiyah, actively campaigned for liberalism, secularism, and pluralism while attacking fellow Muslims who were conservative.[18]

Nevertheless, the conservatives had long gained a strategic momentum to condemn the liberals after MUI issued a fatwa against the liberal group. Through its *fatwa* in 2005, MUI declared the need to protect Islam and Muslims from '*spilis*,' the abbreviation of secularism, pluralism and liberalism.[19] The abbreviation strongly referred to the disease syphilis, which also reflected the destructive image. The *spilis*

[16] Kementerian Agama, *Moderasi Beragama*…, p. 7.

[17] *Ibid*., p. 47.

[18] Ahmad Ali Nurdin, "Islam and State: A Study of the Liberal Islamic Network in Indonesia, 1999-2004," *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2005, pp. 20–39.

[19] P. Gillespie, "Current Issues in Indonesian Islam: Analysing the 2005 Council of Indonesian *Ulama* Fatwa No. 7 Opposing Pluralism, Liberalism and Secularism," *Journal of Islamic Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 202–240.

agenda of the liberal group reserved as a "Western disease" that would potentially destroy Indonesia. For many conservative groups, such as the hardliner Front Pembela Islam/FPI (officially disbanded in 2021) and HTI, the *fatwa* went beyond the condemnation against the liberal group because it was a vindication for their agenda to turn Indonesia into an Islamic state or at least as a strategy to install *sharia* law as the state's constitution. [20]

Nevertheless, on the other side of the spectrum, *moderasi beragama* tried to defy the conservative groups that had gained momentum and followers in the Indonesian religious landscape. The conservatives tended to incite intra-group conflicts within the Indonesian Muslim community as several attacks against minority groups, such as Ahmadiyya-Muslim, kept escalating. The conservative groups also exacerbated inter-religious group relations by protesting the place of non-Muslims in a Muslim-majority public sphere and demanding Muslim favouritism in the state structure and bureaucracy. The groups often initiated attacks on night clubs, calling for the closure of these kinds of places that conservative Muslims considered sinful and contradictory with Islamic norms.

The most recent trial of *moderasi beragama* was the Ahok's case, which escalated in 2017. As we found in Western countries where Islamophobia collides with racial issues, the Ahok's case incites Islamophobia, particularly among the minority Chinese-Indonesian and Christians.[21] The Ahok's case has reenergized anti-Chinese prejudice and

[20] Carool Kersten, *Islam in Indonesia: The Contest for Society, Ideas and Values* (London: Hurst, 2015), p. 1–2.

[21] Popularly known as Ahok, the Chinese-Indonesian and Christian politician Basuki Tjahaya Purnama once served as the vice governor of Jakarta, later as the governor as Joko Widodo was elected president in 2014. Since the beginning, by winning the provincial election in Jakarta, Ahok was a controversial, unfavourable political leader to the eyes of many conservative Muslim groups, mainly the FPI, that had voiced strong opposition for having a non-Muslim leader as early as 2012 when Ahok first took office as the vice governor of Jakarta. The strong opposition emerged on 27 September 2016 when Ahok said people should not vote for a candidate based on religious beliefs, criticising the notion that Muslims cannot have a non-Muslim as

Islamic favouritism within the supposedly non-discriminatory state based on the five principles of Pancasila state, a state that is neither secular nor Islamic. This effect has been an important issue in the 2019 president election, threatening the peaceful coexistence among religious groups in Indonesia. Lukman Hakim, the Minister of Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs who initiated the *moderasi beragama* -and later adopted as one of the ministry's most important programs- envisioned the project as a panacea for social disintegration and disharmony, particularly as a result of the diversity of ethnicities, religions, and cultural identities. This panacea centered on the notion of *wasatiyyah* (middle or moderate), which strongly opposes religious conservatism on the one hand and religious liberalism on the other hand. At the same time, the *wasatiyyah* also demanded statehood loyalty and obedience.[22] The manifesto of *moderasi beragama* writes:

> Religious moderation is truly the key to creating tolerance and harmony, both at local, national, and global levels. Being moderate, by rejecting extremism and liberalism in religion, is the key to balance, for the sake of preserving civilization and creating peace. This way, religious communities are able to treat each other respectfully, accept differences, and live together in peace and harmony. In multicultural societies like Indonesia, religious moderation is not a choice, but a necessity.[23]

Later, the Indonesian president Joko Widodo elevated the official program of *moderasi beragama* as the National Medium-Term Development (Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional/RPJMN) for years

their leader. An edited video of his remarks appeared on social media and incited a series of street protests of Muslim groups that accused Ahok of insulting the Qur'an. Conservative Muslim groups stormed the streets, demanding that the government arrest Ahok and send him to trial. The remarkable street protest, Gerakan 212 (212 Movement), led by Rizieq Shihab, a Hadhrami-*sayyid* and the leader of FPI, successfully mobilized a significant number of Muslims, not only from Jakarta, but also from other cities in Java and outside. On 9 May 2017, Ahok was sentenced to two years in prison.

[22] Kementerian Agama, *Moderasi Beragama...*, p. 16–17.

[23] Kementerian Agama, *Religious Moderation (English Translation)* (Jakarta: Research, Development, Training, and Education Agency The Ministry of Religious Affairs, 2020), p. 18.

2020-2024. Adopting the principle of *moderasi bergama* of Kemenag, the RPJMN reads that "religious moderation is a strategic effort in order to strengthen tolerance and harmony within diversity. Indonesians who embrace diverse religions need to develop insights and attitudes toward religious moderation in order to build mutual understanding, maintain diversity, and strengthen unity among different religious communities. The religious moderation perspective refers to the view that religious people must take the middle ground in the practice of religious life."[24] Ever since, the project of *moderasi beragama* expands as it is adopted as an official program of all Indonesian ministries.

On the Survey and the Site

The survey on *moderasi beragama* is conducted in February-March 2022 involving 2569 data collectors that successfully reported 7473 survey data. The site for the survey includes all sub-districts (*kecamatan*) in the city of Tulungagung, an eastern Javanese town with a total population 1.096.590 people.[25] The city is a middle town in East Java province and is well-known for the production of marble and is known as one of largest home cities of many Indonesian migrant workers. Located in most-south eastern part of Java, it is home to the Javanese with a small portion of Chinese and other ethnic minorities. In 2021, the Indonesian Agency for Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik/BPS) reported that Tulungagung has 1.096.588 total population distributed in 19 sub-districts (*kecamatan*).

Methodologically speaking, the approach of the survey is an approach for surveying those who are in authorities. The survey includes representative sample of 7140 leaders, both male and female, from across religious communities/religious leaders (RL), leader of communities (*tokoh masyarakat*) (LC), and young leaders in the community (YL). They

[24] Kementerian PPN/Bappenas, *Appendix Presidential Regulation No 18 of 2020 Concerning The National Medium-Term Development Plan for 2020-2024*, 2020, p. v-7.

[25] Badan Pusat Statistik Tulungagung, *Tulungagung dalam Angka 2022* (Tulungagung, 2022), p. 93.

are equally distributed in 19 sub-districts in Tulungagung (see table 1).

Table 1: Distribution of respondents based on sub-districts

	RL	LC	YL	Total
Bandung	132	141	116	389
Besuki	127	124	121	372
Boyolangu	143	151	130	424
Campurdarat	125	125	122	372
Gondang	122	127	119	368
Kalidawir	136	121	129	386
Karangrejo	122	127	123	372
Kauman	115	115	106	336
Kedungwaru	118	132	125	375
Ngantru	121	135	108	364
Ngunut	123	132	126	381
Pagerwojo	141	128	132	401
Pakel	133	142	132	407
Pucanglaban	111	119	101	331
Rejotangan	123	129	128	380
Sendang	135	122	118	375
Sumbergempol	126	126	111	363
Tanggunggunung	122	119	120	361
Tulungagung	114	144	125	383
Total	**2389**	**2459**	**2292**	**7140**

As with the distribution of respondents based on sub-districts, the respondents of this survey include male and female leaders. The below table 2 shows that the majority of leaders in the communities are male (4919 people or 68.9%) and 2221 people (31.1%) are female leaders.

Table 2: Distribution of sexes and criteria of respondents

			Male	Female	Total
Criteria of Respondents	RL	Count	1813	576	2389
		% within RL	36.90%	25.90%	33.50%
		% of Total	25.40%	8.10%	33.50%
	LC	Count	1718	741	2459
		% within LC	34.90%	33.40%	34.40%
		% of Total	24.10%	10.40%	34.40%
	YL	Count	1388	904	2292
		% within YL	28.20%	40.70%	32.10%
			19.40%	12.70%	32.10%
Total		Count	4919	2221	7140
		% within total	68.90%	31.10%	100.00%

The census by the Indonesian Statistics, the data of religion department in Tulungagung Regency, the majority of people in Tulungagung are Muslim (98,50 percents), Christian (1,11 percent), Catholic (0,28 percent), Buddhist (0,08 percent), Hindu (0,01 percents), Konghucu (0,00001 percent) and other religions/beliefs (0,01 percent). The survey on the other hand includes 6 religions/local beliefs and 99,3% of respondents are Muslim. These religious adherents are distributed in 19 sub-districts is shown in the below table 3.

Table 3: Distribution based on sub-district and religion

	Buddhism	Hindu	Islam	Catholicism	Other belief	Christia nity	Total
Bandung	0	0	389	0	0	0	389
Besuki	0	1	370	0	0	1	372
Boyolangu	0	0	422	0	0	2	424
Campurdarat	0	0	370	0	0	2	372
Gondang	0	0	367	0	0	1	368
Kalidawir	0	0	385	0	1	0	386
Karangrejo	0	0	371	0	0	1	372
Kauman	0	0	331	2	0	3	336

Kedungwaru	0	0	370	1	0	4	375
Ngantru	0	0	364	0	0	0	364
Ngunut	0	0	379	1	0	1	381
Pagerwojo	0	0	400	0	0	1	401
Pakel	0	0	407	0	0	0	407
Pucanglaban	0	0	330	1	0	0	331

The below table 4 shows that 99.3% of the respondents (7093 people) are Muslims, thus it is clear that the survey has significant insight as to which the addressed issues reverberate among the majority Muslim in the city. As we see the below table (table 4), it is not unusual for Muslims in Tulungagung to have non-Muslim leaders particularly among RL and LC. It is now not the case for non-Muslim YL which only compromise 7 people compared to RL (21 people) and LC (19 people). This number clearly demonstrates the level of acceptance of non-Muslim as leaders resonates among RL and LC rather than YL.

Table 4: Religion

			Buddha	**Hindu**	**Islam**	**Catholics**	**Other religion**	**Christians**	**Total**
Criteria of Respondents	RL	Count	1	0	2368	7	0	13	2389
		% within RL	0.00%	0.00%	99.10%	0.30%	0.00%	0.50%	100.00%
		% of Total	0.00%	0.00%	33.20%	0.10%	0.00%	0.20%	33.50%
	LC	Count	0	1	2440	5	1	12	2459
		% within LC	0.00%	0.00%	99.20%	0.20%	0.00%	0.50%	100.00%
		% of Total	0.00%	0.00%	34.20%	0.10%	0.00%	0.20%	34.40%
	YL	Count	0	1	2285	1	1	4	2292
		% within YL	0.00%	0.00%	99.70%	0.00%	0.00%	0.20%	100.00%
		% of Total	0.00%	0.00%	32.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.10%	32.10%

Total	Count	1	2	7093	13	2	29	7140
	% within total	0.00%	0.00%	99.30%	0.20%	0.00%	0.40%	100.00%

It is also worth-noting that the survey also tells that the majority of respondents are affiliated to the Nahdlatul *Ulama* (5500 people or 77%), the largest traditionalist Muslim organisation in Indonesia, whereas a small minority is identifying themselves as members of the modernist Muhammadiyah, of *salafi* groups, of Lembaga *Dakwah* Islam Indonesia/ LDII), and 1527 (21.45) are not affiliated to any Muslim organisation.

Table 5: Affiliation to Islamic Organisation

			Salafi	**LDII**	**Muham madiyah**	**NU**	**Non-affiliated**	**Total**
Criteria of Respondents	RL	Count	5	16	21	2048	299	2389
		% within RL	0.20%	0.70%	0.90%	85.70%	12.50%	100.00%
		% of Total	0.10%	0.20%	0.30%	28.70%	4.20%	33.50%
	LC	Count	1	7	31	1654	766	2459
		% within LC	0.00%	0.30%	1.30%	67.30%	31.20%	100.00%
		% of Total	0.00%	0.10%	0.40%	23.20%	10.70%	34.40%
	YL	Count	2	12	18	1798	462	2292
		% within YL	0.10%	0.50%	0.80%	78.40%	20.20%	100.00%
			0.00%	0.20%	0.30%	25.20%	6.50%	32.10%
Total		Count	8	35	70	5500	1527	7140
		% within total	0.10%	0.50%	1.00%	77.00%	21.40%	100.00%

On *Moderasi Beragama:* A Descriptive Analytic

As the largest Muslim country and a pluralistic society, maintaining communal harmony among different religious groups has been of importance issue. Throughout history, there had been efforts to challenge the state ideology Pancasila (the five pillars) and the demand

for establishing an Islamic state had coloured Indonesian early history following the state's independence in 1945. In 1970s-1980s, some attacks against the government did occur and following the fall of New Order in 1998, the attacks had been intensified as terrorist groups launched their attacks. At the Indonesia parliament after the fall of New Order, some parties publicly demanded for the implementation of Islamic law and the Pancasila is the battle ground for this demand. It was believed that Indonesia had been on its way to an Islamic state. Thus, *moderasi beragama* advocates the Pancasila as the sole ideology of the state as a bridging ideology between secularism and theocracy. The manifesto of *moderasi beragama* reads:

> With regards to the state, the principle of moderation can be traced to the early days of the independence in which the founding fathers of the nation were able to unite despite having a variety of ideas, political interests, religions, and beliefs. Everyone moved to the middle, finding common ground to jointly accept the formation of the Republic of Indonesia as a mutual agreement. The willingness to accept the Republic of Indonesia as the final form of governance can be categorized as a tolerant and moderate attitude.

Nevertheless, the issue of Pancasila and the demand for Islamic state does not reflect in the minds and hearts of leaders in Tulungagung. Our survey demonstrates that 7118 people (99,7%) agree that Pancasila is the state ideology and only 22 people (0,3%) rejected the Pancasila (see table 6).

Table 6: Pancasila as the State Ideology

			Strongly agree	Strongly disagree	Agree	Disagree	Total
Religion and State Ideology	RL	Count	1767	5	612	5	2389
		% within RL	74.00%	0.20%	25.60%	0.20%	100.00%
		% of Total	24.70%	0.10%	8.60%	0.10%	33.50%
	LC	Count	1805	3	651	0	2459
		% within LC	73.40%	0.10%	26.50%	0.00%	100.00%
		% of Total	25.30%	0.00%	9.10%	0.00%	34.40%

	YL	Count	1718	7	565	2	2292
		% within YL	75.00%	0.30%	24.70%	0.10%	100.00%
			24.10%	0.10%	7.90%	0.00%	32.10%
Total		Count	5290	15	1828	7	7140
		% within Total	74.10%	0.20%	25.60%	0.10%	100.00%

Importantly, the survey also finds that the respondents find the principle of Pancasila are in line with principles of religion. Table 7 shows that 7087 people (99.3%) see the five principles of Pancasila confirms principles of religion.

Table 7: Pancasila conforms principles of religion

			Strongly Agree	**Strongly disagree**	**Agree**	**Not-Answered**	**Disagree**	**Total**
Pancasila and values of religion	RL	Count	1465	5	904	13	2	2389
		% within RL	61.30%	0.20%	37.80%	0.50%	0.10%	100.00%
		% of Total	20.50%	0.10%	12.70%	0.20%	0.00%	33.50%
	LC	Count	1509	3	937	9	1	2459
		% within LC	61.40%	0.10%	38.10%	0.40%	0.00%	100.00%
		% of Total	21.10%	0.00%	13.10%	0.10%	0.00%	34.40%
	YL	Count	1451	7	821	10	3	2292
		% within YL	63.30%	0.30%	35.80%	0.40%	0.10%	100.00%
			20.30%	0.10%	11.50%	0.10%	0.00%	32.10%
Total		Count	4425	15	2662	32	6	7140
		% within Total	62.00%	0.20%	37.30%	0.40%	0.10%	100.00%

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the majority of respondents think that Pancasila is the valid national ideology, they seem to disagree on the roles of Pancasila and the 1945 Indonesia constitution as the only sources of Indonesian law. The survey shows that 423 respondents (5,9%) [strongly] disagree to limit the state ideology and constitution as

the only sources of Indonesia law (see table 8). It is perhaps because Islam is seen as an alternative source of law and thus the campaign for the implementation of Islamic law seems resonate also in the minds of Muslim.

Table 8: Pancasila and the 1945 Indonesia Constitution as the only sources of Indonesia Law

			Strongly Agree	Strongly disagree	Agree	Not-answered	Disagree	Total
Criteria of Respondents	RL	Count	1237	10	995	4	143	2389
		% within RL	51.80%	0.40%	41.60%	0.20%	6.00%	100.00%
		% of Total	17.30%	0.10%	13.90%	0.10%	2.00%	33.50%
	LC	Count	1260	5	1062	3	129	2459
		% within LC	51.20%	0.20%	43.20%	0.10%	5.20%	100.00%
		% of Total	17.60%	0.10%	14.90%	0.00%	1.80%	34.40%
	YL	Count	1246	9	907	3	127	2292
		% within YL	54.40%	0.40%	39.60%	0.10%	5.50%	100.00%
			17.50%	0.10%	12.70%	0.00%	1.80%	32.10%
Total		Count	3743	24	2964	10	399	7140
		% within Total	52.40%	0.30%	41.50%	0.10%	5.60%	100.00%

As we look at the issue of tolerance, our survey shows that interreligious intolerance still a problem for contemporary Indonesian Muslim. Of total respondents of the survey, 567 people (9.2%) refuse to deliver protection of religious activities of other religions (see table 9). The problem of religious proselytization i.e., Christianisation is still a major issue within the grassroots.

Table 9: Protecting religious activities of other religions

		RL	LC	YL	Total
Protecting religious activities of other religions	Strongly Agree	682	738	678	2098
		28.50%	30.00%	29.60%	29.40%
	Strongly disagree	8	6	8	22
		0.30%	0.20%	0.30%	0.30%
	Agree	1445	1507	1411	4363
		60.50%	61.30%	61.60%	61.10%
	Not answer	6	7	6	19
		0.30%	0.30%	0.30%	0.30%
	Disagree	248	201	189	545
		9.40%	8.10%	8.30%	8.90%
Total		2389	2459	2292	7140
		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Despite the fact that interreligious tolerance is still a threat to the consistence between religious communities, our survey finds that intolerance between groups of the same religion is the most-alarming problem. It shows that 1487 people (20,8%) does not tolerate different groups with the same religion. The issue of Ahmadiyya and Syi'ah are two important topics that drive Muslim intolerance.

Table 10: Tolerance upon other groups within same the religion

		RL	LC	YL	Total
Tolerance upon other groups within same the religion	Strongly agree	514	540	562	1616
		21.5%	22.0%	24.5%	22.6%
	Strongly disagree	34	29	24	87
		1.4%	1.2%	1.0%	1.2%
	Agree	1349	1395	1281	4025
		56.5%	56.7%	55.9%	56.4%
	Not answer	5	5	2	12
		0.2%	0.2%	0.1%	0.2%
	Disagree	487	490	423	1400
			19.9%	18.5%	19.6%
Total		2389	2459	2292	7140
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

In addition, the survey also tells that support for religious violence does not significantly resonate for it is only 274 respondents (3.8%) reveal their supports for violent acts on behalf of religion. The majority of respondents are against a such act (see table 11).

Table 11: Religious Violence

		RL	LC	YL	Total
Support for religious violence	No	2286	2356	2202	6844
		95.7%	95.8%	96.1%	95.9%
	Not answer	6	9	7	22
		0.3%	0.4%	0.3%	0.3%
	Yes	97	94	83	274
			3.8%	3.6%	3.8%
Total		2389	2459	2292	7140
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

In addition to the issue of support for religious violence, the survey also demonstrates that respondents support for the protection of religious practices and rituals. In Indonesia, the issue of protection for practicing religious beliefs and rituals of minority groups is a contesting problem, particularly in urban areas, like in Jakarta and Bekasi in West Java. In a peripheral city like Tulungagung, the issue of religious protection for minority groups is receiving a popular support. The survey shows that 6852 respondents (96%) send their support for the protection for minority groups to practice their religion (see table 12).

Table 12: Protection the rights to practice religions of others

		RL	LC	YL	Total
Commitment to protect rights to practice religion	Strongly agree	919	949	928	2796
		38.50%	38.60%	40.50%	39.20%
	Strongly disagree	7	6	6	19
		0.30%	0.20%	0.30%	0.30%
	Agree	1373	1412	1271	4056
		57.50%	57.40%	55.50%	56.80%
	Not answer	10	10	10	30
		0.40%	0.40%	0.40%	0.40%
	Disagree	80	82	77	239
			3.30%	3.30%	3.40%
Total		2389	2459	2292	7140
		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

The last element of *moderasi beragama* is the acceptance of local rituals. It is still unclear what it means by local rituals. Anthropologists for example contest the distinction of "great and little" tradition because this distinction particularly presupposes a conceptual distinction between 'pure' and 'impure' practices. For the American anthropologist Mark Woodward, local Islam is that set of oral, written, and ritual texts that are unknown outside of their area of origin. They derive from the interaction of local culture and 'Received Islam'. Local Islam is in this regard deemed as any form of religious practice which is lived out by a massive ordinary Muslim and should be distinguished from a particular notion referring to unorthodox form Islam, "folk and little tradition".[26]

Nevertheless, we could argue the notion of acceptance to local cultures implies as to which religious believers accept diversities of interpretation and varieties of Islamic rituals which might be alien to the landscape of origin of Islam in Arabia. In Indonesia, we could easily point to a wide range of religious practices which are popular among traditionalist Muslim, such as *tahlilan, slametan*, and manifestation of local pilgrimages (*ziarah*). The survey shows that

[26] Mark R. Woodward, *Java, Indonesia and Islam* (Heidelberg, London, etc.: Springer, 2011), p. 43.

majority or respondents do accept -and actively participate- in local Islamic practices and only 665 respondents (9.4%) who reject such practices (see table 13).

Table 13: Participation at local religious practices

		RL	LC	YL	Total
Participation at local religious tradition at surrounding communities	Strongly agree	674	715	692	2081
		28.20%	29.10%	30.20%	29.10%
	Strongly disagree	3	4	5	12
		0.10%	0.20%	0.20%	0.20%
	Agree	1474	1506	1383	4363
		61.70%	61.20%	60.30%	61.10%
	Not answer	10	6	8	24
		0.40%	0.20%	0.30%	0.30%
	Disagree	228	228	204	660
			9.30%	8.90%	9.20%
Total		2389	2459	2292	7140
		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Conclusion

There has been an alarmist finding by many scholars who say the jeopardizing religious tolerance following the fall of New Order in 1998 and the rise of "conservative turn" and the "demise of moderate Islam". Nevertheless, our survey shows otherwise for it demonstrates the society's support for nationalism, state's ideology, and religious tolerance. The respondents who are mostly Muslim leaders in their communities particularly accept religious differences and are willing to accept other religious adherents in their surrounding and to protect the minority's rights to practice their religion.

Nevertheless, the survey also shows that the contemporary problem not extra-religious adherents but internal groups within the same religion. There have been 1487 respondents (20,8%) who stated their disagreement for pluralities within the same religion. Rejection on Syi'ah and Ahmadiyya communities are two par-examples of their refusal

to minority groups within the religion. At the issue of state ideology, we could say that the majority of respondents accept Pancasila as the state ideology and see no-contradiction between religion [Islam] and Pancasila. As for religious violence, the majority of respondents say that they refuse all forms of violence on behalf of religion. The survey also demonstrates that the respondents agree -and are willing to participate- to local religious customs, rituals, and tradition. Thus, the survey concludes that a significant portion of society is moderate as they accept the state' ideology. They refuse violence on behalf of religion, show a high degree of tolerance -with exception to minority groups within the same religion- and accept and/or practice local religious tradition. Therefore, it is also argued that the state's project of *moderasi beragama* should seriously take into account to whom the project is projected. Otherwise, this official project would eventually become obsolete because of it is attempting to convert the converted or, in other words, moderating the moderate.

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