THE POLITICS OF A LOCAL SUFISM IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA A Closed Look at The Shiddiqiyyah Tarekat

This article discusses the politics of local Sufi group (tarekat) in Indonesia, the Shiddiqiyyah. It addresses the locality of Shiddiqiyah tarekat and its politics during New Order Indonesia and following the fall of the regime. It is argued that the Shiddiqiyah, a local tarekat with its roots in East Java and later successfully welcomes national reputation, is an example of a tarekat that utilizes nationalistic slogan to expand its influence as well as to protect the tarekat from heretic accusation. Through a series of intensive fieldwork, the article argues that the Shiddiqiyyah has successfully maintained ideological patronage to the New Order Indonesia through nationalistic slogan which has been a core value of the group. The doctrine of nationalism has been translated in Sufi and Javanese idioms and become fundamental doctrine of the Shiddiqiyyah. [Artikel ini mengkaji tentang dimensi politik dalam salah satu kelompok tarekat lokal bernama Shiddiqiyyah. Secara spesifik, studi ini fokus pada era Orde Baru dan pasca ketumbangannya sebagai bagian penting bahwa Tarekat Shiddiqiyyah mampu menunjukkan eksistensi di tengah rezim yang sensitif dan represif. Dapat dikatakan bahwa Tarekat Shiddiqiyah—yang berakar di Jawa Timur dan kemudian mendapatkan reputasi nasional itu—adalah contoh tarekat yang berhasil memanfaatkan slogan nasionalisme sebagai DOI: 10.21274/epis.2021.16.1.59-82


Introduction
The rise of Islamist groups in contemporary Indonesia has challenged the image of smiling Islam and signaled to the so-called "conservative turn". 1 The Islamist groups particularly promote a clearcut Islamic orthodoxy and their agenda seem to threaten the diversity of Islamic practices and beliefs as well as the prime Indonesian state ideology, the Unitary Republic of Indonesia (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia/NKRI). Nevertheless, Islamism is indeed a loose range category that might appear in different forms and groupings. Sufism, for instance, despite well-known for its inclusive teachings, can also be categorized as orthodox. Salafi Sufi, as indicated by Howell, 2 is a form of Salafi adoption of ascetic behavior with several provisions strictly adhering to the basic principle of Islam (shari'a). This form of Sufism often reserves as the proponents of radical orthodoxy.
This article addresses the Indonesian-based Sufi order, the Shiddiqiyyah tarekat. It is a local Sufi group that emerged in Ploso village in Jombang, East Java, and later gained a national influence. Throughout the article, I argue that local Sufi is not only closely related to genealogical aspect, but also to identities and local dynamics. As Talal Asad argues, the phenomenon of local and global tradition relations in Muslim societies is such a discursive tradition 3 which also applies to Sufism. Therefore, the locality of Sufism lies on the identification of local elements while regarding also the universal dimension of Sufi's teachings and its global genealogies. Thus, a local manifestation of Sufism might to emerge in multiple forms. This multiplicity appears through unification of several existing tarekat, such as the Qadiriyyah wa Naqsyabandiyah 4 and the Khalwatiyyah Samman, 5 through localization of the teachings of global Sufi orders, such as Bayanullah in Nusa Tenggara Barat,6 or through the formation of tarekat-alike, such as Shalawat Wahidiyah, 7 and Dzikrul Ghafilin. 8 As the Shiddiqiyyah, the local aspect of this tarekat particularly appears through the recognition of local values and practices as well as the nationalistic vision by a virtue of spiritual and social identity of the tarekat. Thus, it is true that the Shiddiqiyyah has been particularly attractive to social group to which Clifford Geertz calls as the abangan 9 or the non-practicing Muslims group. 10 The Shiddiqiyyah also offers a glimpse example of Sufi politics in contemporary Indonesia. The Shiddiqiyyah is a well-known champion for its nationalistic slogan through their spiritual activities. The Shiddiqiyyah politics is indeed closely related to the Indonesian New Order government project to 'pacify' Muslim groups in 1970-80s. To do so, the government demanded all Muslim groups, not exclusively Sufi groups, to join the state-sponsored Association for the Improvement of Islamic Education (Gabungan Usaha Perbaikan Pendidikan Islam/GUPPI). 11 One of the founders of Shiddiqiyyah, Kiai Muchtar, was a high rank activist of GUPPI. In return, during the New Order, the Shiddiqiyyah had enjoyed enormous government's supports and facilities.
This article tries to revisit the notion of local Sufi and the Sufi politics. This article is based on ethnographic research that I performed in 2017. The main data was obtained from observations over approximately one year by conducting interviews of Shiddiqiyyah followers and direct observation of their ritual as a participant-observer of the group. During this period, I selected informants based on two categories: interviewing representative of the leader (khalifah), and the followers. The observation was conducted by observing various lectures delivered by the leaders and also based on discussion, both official or informal conversation, and observing various phenomena surrounding the Pesantren Majm'al Bahrain Shiddiqiyyah in Ploso, Jombang. I also collected important data from a variety of official documents, such as lecture transcripts written by the followers and disseminated in various media, such as personal blogs, and social media. Likewise, I also utilized video recordings that were uploaded on their social media platforms, such as Youtube, Instagram, and Facebook. To ensure the accuracy of these media platforms, I contacted the account owner or the administrator through digital tracking and corresponding directly with them.
This article further argues that the Shiddiqiyyah's teaching demonstrates a highly synthesis between Javanese culture and Sufism. The nationalistic slogan, such as the call for fostering the love of the homeland and the cultivation of nationalistic idea, reserves as political vehicle of the group to maintain its significance and influence. The Shiddiqiyyah politics in contemporary Indonesia is an example of Sufi politics and the arts of a Sufi-alike institution, such as the Shiddiqiyyah, to survive through adaptation and patronage to the changing political regime.

Sufi and The State
A majority scholarly discussion on the relationship between Sufism and the state focuses particularly on ideology and Sufi-inspired movements inside or outside the state. This article tries to offers an answer to the question of why a Sufi order embraces nationalistic slogan as one of its fundamental tenets of Sufi teaching and doctrine. Through looking at the historical background of Sufism in Islam, the development of Sufism is indeed dynamic, not only in terms of the varieties of its teaching but also of their contribution to the state. As argued by Trimingham 12 and Schimmel 13 , Sufism is part of the social movement throughout Islamic history. According to the sociologist Ernest Gellner, 14 as Pinto cited, 15 Sufism is a silent and non-political movement in Muslim society, but its existence and development are dynamics. The Sufism movement has been in dialectic relationship with the state since the early days of the Muslim empire or medieval Islam, throughout the colonial period, until the formation of the modern state. During medieval Islam, Sufism seems to be in competition with the Sultanate power. Zawiyah, Khanaqah, or ribat (the building designed for religious gathering Sufi brotherhood) had been centers for Sufi to exercise their power. As for the period of colonialism, some resistance against the colonial government was led by the Sufi groups, as we see in Africa by the Sanusiyyah tarekat 16 and in several regions in Indonesia by the Tijaniyyah tarekat. 17 In later periods, following the foundation of the modern nationstate, tensions between Sufi groups and the government continued, as we found in Turkey that involved the secular Turkish government and the Naqshabandi 18 and in Syria the Naqshbandiyya Kuftariyya and Shadhiliyya tarekat contested the government. Pinto maintains that the relationship between Sufi groups and the government as "dangerous liaisons" as it could bring benefits as well as harmful risks. 19 Pinto also argues that the closeness of Sufi figures with the government will reduce the authority of Sufis as religious leaders whose every decision become a role model of the disciples. The disciples no longer fully respect the fatwa (religious decisions) delivered by the leader. 20 In contrast, Sujuthi 21 has noted the political dynamic of Qadiriyyah wa Naqsyabandiyyah Sufi order in Indonesia. Kiai Musta'in Ramli, one of the leaders of Qadiriyyah wa Naqsyabandiyyah Sufi order in Jombang, exercised tactical steps, such as to plunge into the political arena. The involvement of Sufi figures in the government becomes an agent of change when the national political atmosphere was unstable. Gus Miek, the leader of Dzikrul Ghafilin, the local Sufi group in Kediri, is another example of Sufi leaders taking bold steps in favor of the Indonesian New Order government. 22 The contemporary dynamics of the relationship between Sufis and the state, I argue, is also essential as the former offers counter-narratives to the teachings of extremism and radicalism. As O'Dell argues, the Sufism practices become non-orthodox community that opposed Salafi groups. Some countries in Central Asia defined their national Islamic identities through the Hanafi Mazhab (Islamic jurisprudence school) and Sufism when fighting against the Salafi in Caucasus. 23 O'Dell further explains that Sufism in Central Asia was supported by the state with a variety of different mechanisms. In Uzbekistan, the government helps the Sufi to marketize Sufi shrines for tourists' attraction and foreign diplomacy and encourages women traditional healers to practice in public. In Turkmenistan, government recruited female Sufi practitioners to support the government campaign against radicalization targeting children, while in Tajikistan, Sufi teaching has been a Islamic living tradition of a great majority Muslim. The leader of Turkmenistan, Niyazov, promoted the practice of pilgrimage (ziarah) to tombs of prominent Sufi master (murshid) as a national "duty". This move was intended to "restore historical justice" and to give the invaluable heritage of ancestors to the present and future generations of Turkmen. 24 In addition to the intricated relationship between the Sufi and the state, contemporary dynamics of Sufi in translocal contexts show the continuous identity making. It invites contestation and negotiation as, the Iran-based Sufi group of Shamaghsoudi in London demonstrates. Sahahmaghsoudi Sufi Order formulated a distinct type of Iranian identity which is adapted to the British society and culture. The group also offers a counter-narrative to the Iranian model of Islam which has been eclipsed by the Islamic revolution. Spellman further illustrates that the teachings of Sahahmaghsoudi rooted in Iran are no longer as authentic as its earliest form as it has experienced various forms of contextualization and adaptation in diasporic context. 25 In the same vein, Tschacher stated that the local Sufi tradition, particularly concerning saint veneration in Singapore brought by Indian Tamil immigrants, has experienced a process of migration and transnationalism. Local and national boundaries are no longer easily recognized. Therefore, according to Tschacer, the dichotomy between the two is no longer relevant to see the existence of saint-veneration at the Nagore Durgah (a Sufi shrine adopted from Tamil Culture) in Singapore. 26 As the above discussion on the intricated relationship between the state and the Sufi, it is argued that internal dynamics of the Sufi and the external pressure by the state are mutually dependent. It particularly appears at three conditions: first, when the state confronted colonialism and imperialism, second, when the Sufi was the minority group that required external protection, mainly through state apparatus and policies, in order to maintain the Sufi's identity amid the rising Islamic orthodoxy, and finally, in the situation when the state confronted radical groups. This latter condition particularly appears in Syria and Pakistan where Sufism became an alternative ideology to promote peace while confronting Islamic fundamentalism.
As for the Shiddiqiyyah tarekat, it is reasonably true that the adaptation to the state politics and ideology is a key strategy for the tarekat to acquire the official protection of the state. In so doing, the 25 Kathryn Spellman, "A National Sufi Order with Transnational Dimensions: The Maktab Tarighat Oveyssi Shahmaghsoudi Sufi Order in London," Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 30, No. 5, 2004, pp. 945-960. 26 Torsten Tschacher, "From Local Practice to Transnational Network-Saints, Shrines and Sufis among Tamil Muslims in Singapore," Asian Journal of Social Science, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2006, pp. 238. Shiddiqiyyah claims to be a nationalist Sufi with a trustful Islamic teaching originated from its founder. Thus, one of most important doctrines of the Shiddiqiyyah which reserves as one of oath (bai'at) to join the tarekat, is the testimony to love the homeland (cinta tanah air). In addition, the Shiddiqiyyah has been flourishing among the abangan community who is well-known for their nationalistic doctrine. The nationalistic doctrine of the Shiddiqiyyah has also culminated to the genealogical link of its founder, Kiai Muchtar to the famous rebellious 19 th century Javanese Prince Dipanagara who led the Java war against the Dutch between 1825 and 1830. 27

The Shiddiqiyyah: A Local Sufism
To identify the locality of Shiddiqiyyah, I pursue three main aspects; first is related to their teaching which is adapted to local traditions and their appreciation towards local cultures, second is related to the specific litanies (dhikr), and third is related to the genealogical chain (sanad). Although the founder of Shiddiqiyyah, Kiai Muchtar, refused the identification of the Shiddiqiyyah as a local tarekat, the Javanese characteristics of the Shiddiqiyyah resort as fundamental tenets of the group. The founder Kiai Muchtar was indeed renowned for his deep knowledge on Javanese science mysticism (kejawen). In addition, the Javanese tradition, such as ruwatan, is also well-preserved through the group's ritual. Therefore, different from findings as proposed by scholars, such as Clifford Geertz,28 Niels Mulder,29 Koentjoroningrat, 30 Mark R. 27 Carey P. B. R., The Power of Prophecy: Prince Dipanagara and the End of an Old Order in Java, 1785-1855(Leiden: KITL Press, 2007. 28  Kiai Muchtar combines Javanese mysticism tradition and Sufism. Preserving Javanese, some rituals indeed develop from Javanese tradition but imbued with Sufism nuance. Javanese language is also essential for being the language of bai'at (testimonies of allegiance) of Shiddiqiyyah followers. 36 Kiai Muchtar also dictated their disciples the essence of Javanese mysticism the so-called Ilmu haq layar tujuh pati (the truthful knowledge of seven layered substance). 37 This Javanese treatise is about the concept of human being and their relation with God which is sealed in the doctrine martabat tujuh (seven stages) to whom the 16 th Acehnese Sufi, Hamzah Fansuri, attributed to. 38 There are also several Javanese rituals performed and preserved by the Shiddiqiyyah community, such as 31 Mark R. Woodward, Islam Jawa: Kesalehan Normatif versus Kebatinan (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2004 ritual kajatan. The kajatan also called ujuban is the recitation of the prayer of hope which is symbolized through different meals. The reading of ujuban is performed at the slametan (communal meal) which is performed at the Shiddiqiyyah anniversary of the leaders and rituals such as giving birth, funerals, or commemoration of certain months.
The locality of the Shiddiqiyyah also appears in the ritual of kautsaran, a collective recitation of litanies. Kautsaran is also a compilation of litanies containing several short surah (chapters) in the Qur'an, ba> qiyatus S} a> liha> t, kalimah tayyibah, nafi> ithba> t (several Islamic phrases mostly recited in the ritual), and Asma> al-h} usna (99 names of Allah/God). 39 The Kautsaran was compiled by Kiai Muchtar based on the spiritual inspiration he received during his spiritual journey (muja> hadah) in the range of 1956 from East Java to West Java. 40 The Kautsaran is also compiled based on the virtues which are recommended both in the Qur'an and the hadith. For James J. Fox, Kautsaran is the key ritual that demonstrates the locality of the Shiddiqiyyah tarekat. Kautsaran has been one of the components that support the establishment of the Shiddiqiyyah as a tarekat institution. 41 From the side of genealogy, the sanad (genealogical chain) of Shiddiqiyyah, despite its ambiguity, is related to other tarekats. According to Kiai Muchtar and his followers, the sanad of the Shiddiqiyyah can be found in the book of Tanwi>  Amin al-Kurdi and does not mention the following chain that leads to Kiai Muchtar. He also did not mention how he acquired the leadership (murshid) of Shiddiqiyyah tarekat. 43 The centrality of Amin al-Kurdi in the Shiddiqiyyah is perhaps closely related to another tarekat that also popular in Jombang, the Naqsyabandiyah tarekat. Both tarekat claim to establish their sanad to Amin al-Kurdi. Nevertheless, in Fath} ul ' Arifi> n by Ahmad Khatib al-Makki (1916), the sanad listed in the book ends with Ahmad Khatib al-Makki. 44 Kiai Muchtar claimed that he was connected to Ahmad Khatib through Syua'ib Jamali, the disciple of Nurul Iman. Unfortunately, these latter two names are still being discussed and need to further inquiry whether they are connected or not. If the claim is true, in fact, the sanad of Shiddiqiyyah which is connected to Ahmad Khatib Al-Makki, resorts as an ample proof that the sanad of Shiddiqiyyah which is related to the Qadiriyyah wa Naqsyabandiyah. As it is known, the book of Fath} ul ' Arifi> n is a book about dhikr which also mentions the sanad of the Qadiriyyah wa Naqsyabandiyah. Therefore, it is possible that the Qadiriyyah wa Naqsyabandiyah's sanad is also used by the Shiddiqiyyah .
Nevertheless, several Sufi sources mentioned that the name of Shiddiqiyyah was indeed used by several early Sufi orders 45 including the Egyptian Shiddiqiyyah. However, the Shiddiqiyyah in Egypt has different characteristics from the Shiddiqiyyah in Jombang, Indonesia as the former traces its sanad to Abu Hasan al-Syadili (d. 1258), the founder of Syadiliyyah tarekat. Thus, it is reasonably true that Egyptian Shiddiqiyyah is known also as the Shiddiqiyyah Syadiliyyah, 46 Ramadhani, 1985). 46 Siddiqiya, "Al-Ta'rif Bi al-Thariqah al-Siddiqiyyah al-Shadiliyyah," Al-Thariqah al- Siddiqiyyah al-Shadiliyyah, https://siddiqiya.com/index.php/what-is-siddiqiya, accessed January 21, 2021. Jombang is closer to the Naqsyabandiyah, Qadiriyah wa Naqsyabandiyah or Khalwatiyah, as mentioned above. In other words, the sanad of this tarekat is still problematic, as Zamakhsyar Dhofier also urges. 47 Thus, as the above discussion, the Shiddiqiyyah is indeed par excellence a local Sufism in contemporary Indonesia. The Shiddiqiyyah combines Islamic Sufism and Javanese tradition into a single Sufi group. Thus, the locality of Shiddiqiyyah become a vivid example of the socalled of "Javanese Sufism." Javanese Sufism infers to Sufi that adopt and adapt Javanese and Islamic Sufi tradition, thus the two are in constant negotiation and exchange. In the following discussion, I will turn to another important characteristic of the Shiddiqiyyah and its relation the Indonesian state ideology. This part argues that the Shiddiqiyah not only developed a nationalist identity as a strategy of self-defense from outside attacks but also to counter the disintegration of the nation which began to develop, especially those who came from Islamic conservatism. This phenomenon seems to return to the period in which the Sufism movement was an important agent in maintaining the integrity of a nation in the context of colonialism.

The Nationalistic Ideas of Shiddiqiyyah
The Shiddiqiyyah is well-known for its strong nationalistic slogan. The doctrine of nationalism has been essential for the Shiddiqiyyah and it resorts as a venue to embrace state ideology with a strong Sufi tradition. The doctrine of love of the homeland (cinta tanah air), for example, believed as an authentic hadith rather that the saying of the Prophet's companions (s} ahaba) lies as the core doctrine of the Shiddiqiyyah. Kiai Muchtar believes that the norms of loving the homeland also cannot be separated from the Indonesian independence phenomenon that was given by God. 48 In addition to interpretations of the hadith love of the homeland, Shiddiqiyyah's followers also believe that the history of the Prophet as a figure who loves Makkah more than his love for other cities. The Medina Charter (mi> tha> q al-madi> nah) which unites Muha> jiri> n (the immigrant) and Ansa> r (the native inhabitant), Muslims and Jews in Medina also became the normative source of the nationalistic ideas brought by the Shiddiqiyyah. These normativity and historical construction was contextualized by the Shiddiqiyyah into the context of the Indonesian nation. In so doing, the Shiddiqiyyah demonstrates the nationalistic doctrine through various religious symbols. It is written in various places and also delivered orally on many occasions. This action aims to instill the doctrine that the love of the homeland is an obligation that must be implemented in various aspects of life. In terms of history and the cultural space in which Shiddiqiyyah emerged and developed, Kiai Muchtar claimed that he was the grandson of a warrior during the Diponegoro war. His grandfather, Yai Syuhada was a pupil of the Diponegoro 49 who was famous as a powerful guerrilla and leader of the Javanese war against the Dutch. It is also said that the first Indonesian president Sukarno was a best friend to Kiai 'Abdul Mu'thi, the father of Kiai Muchtar. Soekarno's father, Raden Soekemi had a good relationship with Haji 'Abdul Mu'thi while living in Ploso Jombang as a teacher. The story goes that Soekemi often received financial assistance from Haji 'Abdul Mu'thi, because the teacher's salary he earned was not sufficient to meet the needs of his daily life. In return, Raden Soekemi was also requested to teach the children of Haji 'Abdul Mu'thi, including Kiai Muchtar. 50 Importantly, we should also pay attention to the early foundation of Shiddiqiyyah to better comprehend its nationalistic slogan. As declared as a tarekat group, the Shiddiqiyyah had been contested by majority of Sufi groups in Indonesia. It is argued that the Shiddiqiyyah is a heretic tarekat as having no convincing genealogical links or sanad to mainstream Sufi groups. Consequently, the Shiddiqiyyah has exempted from the list of authentic tarekat groups by two major Indonesian Sufi groups associations, the Jam'iyyah Ahlith Thoriqoh al-Mu'tabaroh an-Nahdliyyah and Jam'iyyah Ahli Thoriqoh Mu'tabaroh Indonesia (JATMI).
This situation led the Shiddiqiyyah to protect their organization from outsiders and nationalism which was promoted by Shiddiqiyyah aimed to attract the attention of the state that their teachings did not deviate from the ideology of Pancasila (Five Principles of the Indonesia State). Thus, the Shiddiqiyyah develops what I call as "ideological strategy." By this strategy, Shiddiqiyyah later received the attention of the state. As a part of supporting the state, during the New Order era, Kiai Muchtar also instructed his followers to vote for the government party, the Golkar 51 and Kiai Muctar was appointed as an important person in the state supported Gabungan Usaha Pembaharuan Pendidikan Islam (GUPPI). 52 Nevertheless, the state backed-up Sufi group is not enclosed to the Shiddiqiyyah only as other Sufi groups, such as Khalwatiyah Samman in North Sulawesi 53 and the Syahadatain in West Java, received generous support from the New Order government.
T h e d o c t r i n e o f nationalism that Shiddiqiyyah indoctrinates appears in many ritual and activities. The Shiddiqiyyah requests the doctrine to love the homeland and to be faithful to Indonesian s t a t e a s f u n d a m e n t a l prerequisite for joining the tarekat. The Shiddiqiyyah requires his followers to read the pledge of allegiance to the homeland before bai'at (oath of allegiance). This pledge of allegiance to the homeland is one of eight agreements that were imposed for the disciples before binding their promises to become members of the tarekat. 51 Orshid, Sejarah Thoriqoh. 52 Mochammad Munif, Sejarah Kemenangan Perjuangan Shiddiqiyyah Pada Tahun 1970, Vol. 2, (Jombang: Al-Ikhwan, 2012. 53 Ubaedillah, "Khalwatiah Samman Tarekat in South Sulawesi, Indonesia (1920S-1998," 637.

Figure 2. Eight obligations of the
Shiddiqiyyah that must be fulfilled Those eight are: able to obey and serve God, able to obey and serve Muhammad as the Prophet, able to obey and serve parents, able to serve other people, able to serve The Unitary of the Republic of Indonesia, able to love of Indonesia as a homeland, able to practice Tarekat Shiddqiiyyah teaching, and able to appreciate the time. 54 In addition to basic principles, the words atas berkat rahmat Allah yang Maha Kuasa (as for the blessing of Allah's almighty), a sentence which is written in the earliest Indonesian constitution on 1945, become a faithful sentence among the Shiddiqiyyah members. In many documents of the Shiddiqiyyah, this sentence is always written after basmalah (the first verse of the Qur'an) and recited in many speeches. According to Kiai Muchtar, the sentence delivers a deep meaning for Indonesians. Without the soul and philosophy of this sentence, Indonesians would surely fail to protect diversities of the Indonesian.
Manunggaling keimanan lan kemanusiaan (the unity between faith and humanity) and also the triple S: Silaturrahmi (friendship), Santun (polite), and Sedekah (alms) are two other fundamental doctrine of the Shiddiqiyyah. In so doing, the Shiddiqiyyah establishes also the Persaudaraan Cinta Tanah Air Indonesia (PCTAI) which promotes the principle of unity of faith and humanity. Although the organization was initiated by an Islamic organization, the PCTAI as exemplifies through its flag (see the following flag) accommodates various religions in Indonesia. The "top three yellow dots" reflect the basis of several religions: Trinity in the Christian and Catholic, Tripitaka in Buddhist, Trimurti in Hinduism, and San Cai in Confucius. The symbol of "+" on the right and left is called tapak dara in the Buddhist, the cross in the Christianity, the swastika symbol in Hinduism. 55

Figure 3. the flag of PCTAI
To conclude the above discussion, we could argue that the entanglement between Sufism and the doctrine of nationalism should be better comprehend through the historical dynamics of Shiddiqiyyah. At the beginning of its development, Shiddiqiyyah adopted an ideological strategy to protect the group from external threats and accusations. To do so, the Shiddiqiyyah embraced nationalism as its ideological protection and identity. According to Syakur, 56 the closeness of Shiddiqiyyah to the state ideologically is a survival strategy of the movement. In its history, not only Shiddiqiyyah but also the Sufi orders, naturally, struggled to maintain its existence and persist in attracting followers. The Sufi orders are in a social arena that cannot be separated from social conflict. Therefore, the survival movement is a necessity for them. In the context of Shiddiqiyyah, the problem faced at the beginning of its development is the allegation of deviant teachings from various circles, including came from the JATMAN. It was confirmed by Kiai Muchtar, that Shiddiqiyyah was accused of being a deviant sect and teaching the kejawen (the Javanese mysticism 56 Abd Syakur, "Gerakan Tarekat Shiddiqiyyah Pusat Losari, Ploso, Jombang: Studi tentang Strategi Bertahan, Struktur Mobilisasi, dan Proses Pembingkaian" (Disertasi, UIN Sunan Kalijaga, 2008). teaching) and Shamanism. He said the slander against Shiddiqiyah came from various directions. Indeed, disputes between Shiddiqiyyah and their oppositions were resolved in court. 57 Therefore, looking at the background of the emergence of Shiddiqiyyah, I argue that their nationalist ideology is an effort to strengthen the organization. In the 1970s, nationalist organizations received sufficient recognition from the Indonesian government. Consequently, it is not surprising if the Shiddiqiyyah received political privileges and protection from the New Order government. Nevertheless, following the fall of New Order and the subsequent recognition by JATMAN in 2009, the external threats have been diminishing. The Shiddiqiyyah experiences further periods which I would call as "the period for struggle and defense". The first period is the phase where Shiddiqiyyah has not been recognized as a tarekat organization by JATMAN or by society. Whereas the second phase is the phase after Shiddiqiyyah is recognized as the tarekat mu'tabarah (recognized Sufi order) and accepted by the wider community. From these two phases, I contend that the nationalism promoted by Shiddiqiyyah suffered a change in motives and functions. In the first phase, the Nationalism of Shiddiqiyyah was can be seen as a form of ideology for the survival of an organization. At that time the local tarekat was similar to the Indonesian minority of beliefs (aliran kepercayaan) that were stigmatized by the community negatively. The only way that can be done to maintain the organization is by showing identity as an integral part of the state ideology. With this strategy, it will get recognition from the state even though some people are still reluctant to admit it.
After receiving recognition from the wider community and the authority of tarekat organizations in Indonesia, the problems faced by Shiddiqiyyah were different. The rise of Islamism that disturbs the diversity of religious ways is a threat in itself. Shiddiqiyyah made nationalism an advocacy effort for understanding Islamic moderatism. Shiddiqiyyah with his character taught the importance of maintaining diversity, seeing the emergence of Islamism as a threat that must be addressed early on. The defense strategy employed by Shiddiqiyyah was effective because it was based on a very strong doctrine. I argue that the nationalism branding strategy developed by Shiddiqiyyah has fulfilled the ideal criteria of ideology and can survive amid the current of social change. Shiddqiyyah can easily call up various socio-religious problems that arise, both on a national and international scale, one of them is the issue of Islamism. Shiddiqiyyah has advocated a moderate understanding of Islam with various efforts and movements.

Conclusion
The locality of Shiddiqiyyah particularly appears through synthesis of Sufism Javanese mysticism. Shiddiqiyyah also represents a local tarekat in Indonesia that successfully adopts the state ideology and campaigns nationalism through Sufi activities at the grassroots. The adoption of the state ideology is reasonable if we look at the history of the Shiddiqiyyah. In 1973, when the Shiddiqiyyah foundation was firstly established, at the same time as the external conflict faced by Shiddiqiyyah, the founder, Kiai Muchtar made nationalism as the strategy to survive amidst negative stigma coming from society and mainstream Islamic organizations. At that time Shiddiqiyyah was a minority of Sufi group organizations, famously known as a local Sufism as mentioned by Bruinessen 58 and Syam. 59 At the peak of Islamic conservative-turn in contemporary Indonesia, the Shiddiqiyyah plays as an agent advocating and promoting moderate Islamic understanding, by respecting plurality and diversity. 58 Martin van Bruinessen, Kitab Kuning, Pesantren dan Tarekat (Yogyakarta: Gading Publishing, 2012). 59 Nur Syam, "Kata Pengantar," Tasawuf Kultural: Fenomena Salawat Wahidiyyah (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2008).